Human Life as a Foundation for Ethical Health-Care Decisions: A Synthesis of the Work of E. D. Pellegrino and W. A. Wallace. by Whelton, Beverly J.B.
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 69 | Number 4 Article 2
November 2002
Human Life as a Foundation for Ethical Health-
Care Decisions: A Synthesis of the Work of E. D.
Pellegrino and W. A. Wallace.
Beverly J.B. Whelton
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Whelton, Beverly J.B. (2002) "Human Life as a Foundation for Ethical Health-Care Decisions: A Synthesis of the Work of E. D.
Pellegrino and W. A. Wallace.," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 69: No. 4, Article 2.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol69/iss4/2
~ 
I 
Human Life as a Foundation for 
Ethical Health Care Decisions: 
A Synthesis of the Work of 
E. D. Pellegrino and W. A. Wallace.1 
by 
Beverly J. B. Whelton, Ph.D., MSN. 
The author is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, 
Wheeling Jesuit University, Wheeling, West Virginia. 
Professionals, in the traditional understanding, have been a people set aside 
by society to fulfill necessary roles. The professions have a unique body of 
knowledge, an acknowledged status in the community, rights and 
responsibilities, and the authority to fulfill their role. They also have 
certain immunities and protections in performing their prescribed duties. 
For example, physicians and nurses are protected from accusations of 
impropriety in the legitimate performance of examinations, intimate 
hygienic measures, and treatments. Physicians are granted rights and 
responsibilities in making life and death decisions. While acknowledging 
that everyone makes mistakes, people trust and confide in their doctors and 
nurses. 
The professions include physicians, nurses, lawyers, ministers and 
professors. These are still considered professions, but the word is now used 
for virtually everyone, e. g., housekeepers, barbers, babysitters, and sales 
persons. This diverse usage erodes the meaning of profession. For the 
health care practitioners themselves, there has been further erosion of the 
meaning of "professional". Only a few years ago, the taking of vows as a 
nurse or physician was a solemn rite of commitment to the good of the 
individuals and community one served. The oath was foundational for 
codes of ethics that expressed behavioral norms. Today this commitment is 
weakened by competition with demands of providing for one's self and 
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family, science and technology, or conformity with rules of health care 
insurance providers. 
Additionally, our present age of technology challenges the very 
meaning of life and death, as well as life's normal modes of generation and 
promotion. Technological possibilities are on the verge of transforming life 
from a gift into a commodity to be selected, manipulated and chosen or 
rejected. With these technological advances that challenge the meaning of 
human life, changes in the meaning of "professional," and the changing 
social and professional climate, one has to ask if there is a stable foundation 
for ethical standards. This foundation would need to be pervasive 
throughout health care and it would have to not be subject to social 
construction. For these reasons we turn to nature itself and human nature as 
that which is naturally behind human action, society, and professional 
relationships. 
Edmund D. Pellegrino has written extensively and as an insider on 
medicine as a profession and obligations that emerge from being a 
profession, a body of professed healers, men and women who acknowledge 
publicly their responsibilities and are given the legitimate authority (that 
attends their profession and acquisition of medical knowledge and skill that 
they hold in trust.) grounded in both patient vulnerability (vulnerability 
imposed by illness) and the possession of a body of scientific knowledge 
that can positively ameliorate the patient's condition. Pellegrino seeks 
moral authority of the helping and healing professions from within the 
professions themselves. For medicine this can be found within the clinical 
encounter as a transaction between two humans .2 He writes, "There is 
something essentially in the nature of medicine as a kind of human activity 
which determines its ends and its ethics internally." He continues that 
medicine occurs at "that moment when some human being in distress seeks 
help from a physician within the context of a system of care."3 
Pelligrino reports that he accepts a moderate realist epistemology and an 
Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretation of human life.4 With his colleague 
David C. Thomasma, he uses Christianity as a supplement to his ethical 
standards grounded in the professional relationship.5 Christianity with its 
focus on equality and charity becomes an effective religious guide. 
However, there are many committed physicians who are not Christian. 
Additionally, this is a philosophical work and a natural standard is sought. 
The insight behind this paper is that human nature gives rise to society, 
human relationships, the need for care (patiency), the desire and ability to 
care for others (agency) and thus, would itself be a philosophical foundation 
for practice.6 
The goal of this paper, then, is to clarify the meaning of moderate 
realism and to provide an exposition of human nature that is consistent 
within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. It is believed that human nature 
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and a grasp of principles and causes following upon human nature provide a 
stable foundation for ethical health care practices. Although Pellegrino 
focuses on the physician-patient relationship (the fact of illness, profession, 
and medical knowledge7 ) as the ground for ethical practice he presumes 
the content of human nature. It seems that ethical principles that flow from 
human nature would deepen and expand the physician-patient relationship 
as a ground for ethical decision-making. Thus, it is believed there is value 
in making this content on nature and human nature explicit. To this end we 
will turn to examine principles and causes within the contemporary 
Aristotelian-Thomistic exposition of human nature by William A. Wallace.8 
Wallace would agree that there are aspects of being human 
(properties, capacities and values) that provide guidelines for ethical 
practice. Wallace argues that human nature ought to be the basis for any 
professional ethics, engineering or medicine.9 We would agree because the 
very humanity of the patient and practitioner is not subject to social 
construction. Additionally, as already stated above, human needs and 
capacities are the bases for professional relationships. Thus, we would 
again assert that human life itself needs to be given priority as a stable basis 
of health care practices. To this end, this present work will integrate the 
insights of Wallace and Pellegrino to propose ethical standards of health 
care practices founded on the humanity of patient and practitioner. 
This synthesis of Wallace and Pellegrino will begin with clarification 
of realism as meant by Pellegrino and Wallace, then turn to nature, 
principles and causes in nature, then human nature. At that point we will 
return to consider some ethical principles that emerge from this foundation. 
Realism10 
The denial of the intelligibility of nature in the present day can be 
traced back to limitations on reason proposed by the Eighteenth Century 
work of David Hume. Without knowledge of natural kinds (natures), what 
is known are sensations from experience and the way empirical sensory 
data are associated by the mind. Through the early Twentieth Century 
scholarship in Vienna known as the Vienna Circle, this perspective became 
popular as logical positivism (sometimes referred to as logical empiricism). 
Since experience is personal and knowing from experimentation (usually 
on the hypothetical-deductive model) is probable, what is accepted as 
current science is always revisable as new experiences and experimental 
results emerge. There is, thus, within science no stable body of knowledge. 
There are however, currently accepted belief systems. 
In contrast to this more skeptical account, realism in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition, often called moderate realism, holds that things and 
individuals in this extra-mental world are intelligible and form a basis for 
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evaluating propositions about the world. In this view, reason can move 
beyond sensory experience to provide knowledge of natural kinds and their 
capacities that serve as explanatory principles of observable effects. I I 
Aristotle wrote on every aspect of human knowing, i.e., the meaning 
of matter, the composition of substances, nature, language, logic, scientific 
method, and human action in ethics, politics, and economics. In his 
Physics, Aristotle taught that the world is intelligible, that is, knowable 
because of the form that all things of the same kind have in common. 
Because of this shared form there is regularity and stability in the world. 
This regularity in nature allows one to identify a tree as a tree and a 
diamond as a diamond. According to his writings, On the Soul, the human 
intellect abstracts the form present within the individual's perception of the 
particular tree as a universal concept that can be applied to other items of 
the same kind, thus allowing humans to both make sense of the world and 
to communkate. The knower can now label a tree as "tree" according to 
conceptual content stored in memory. If the item is a tree or a diamond, as 
one thought, the judgment is correct. If not, it is in error. This difference 
gives rise to the distinctions of truth and falsity. Our grasp of the form as 
universal concept is complete or incomplete, but our judgment of the match 
between the content in the intellect and the extra-mental world is true or 
false. 
Through analogical reasoning, Aristotle accepted that the mind was 
made to know the world and to come to truth, just as the eyes were made to 
see and the tongue to taste. To know is the function and truth is the object 
of the intellect. Just as certain conditions must be met in order for one to 
see, e.g., the presence of light is required for color to become apparent, 
there are conditions that make knowing possible and the discovery of truth 
more likely. Additionally, just as illness can alter the sense of taste, 
intellectual defects can alter the capacity or the way one comes to 
knowledge. Patterns of reasoning must be developed. These types of 
reasoning include: speculative reasoning characteristic of science, the 
productive reasoning characteristic of art and practice, and deliberation 
characteristic of practical life. Inquiry requires prerequisite mental 
preparation. The preparation and methodology are determined by the 
subject of the inquiry. For this reason, the education of the physicist is 
different from the architect or the nurse. 
Scientific knowledge derives from an understanding of the object of 
inquiry. For example, an observational study of emeralds reveals that, thus 
far, all emeralds are green and, probably, all emeralds will be green. But, 
one must allow for the potential of finding a non-green emerald. In the 
philosophy of science this is called the problem of induction. It results 
from inquiry that is just concerned with phenomena or effects. 12 
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However, when one studies the crystalline structure of the emerald, 
one discovers that the angle of reflection is such that the crystal called an 
emerald reflects only green light rays. Thus, it is within the nature of the 
emerald to be green. It cannot be another color. Alterations in the 
crystalline structure that result in reflection of another color result in the 
stone being a different gem. In the same way, if one is to understand human 
behavior on the deeper, explanatory level of science, one needs to 
understand human nature, that form which makes a human be human . 
Nature 
Looking out the window we see the flowers , grass, trees, maybe even 
fields and mountains or the beach. These are nature in the larger sense of 
the world around us. We may think we control our environment but then 
winds blow, the earth shakes or the water rises; we are called to remember 
that we are only a part of nature. In addition to nature as this world outside 
of the window or in the park, each person or thing has a nature that makes 
it be what it is. According to Aristotle nature is an internal principle of 
activity and rest. In the Physics, nature is defined as "a source or cause of 
being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in 
virtue of itself and not in virtue of some concomitant attribute."1 3 Nature is 
intimately inherent to the thing of which it is the principle. It is not 
accidental to what the item or person is nor externally applied to it. This 
internal principle of activity and rest generates a thing of a particular kind 
or class. It also gives rise within the thing to the properties that allow us to 
identify it as what it is. For example, squirrels are of a particular shape and 
size, live in trees, and have the habit of storing nuts for the winter. We can 
argue whether squirrels are black, grey, grey and white, or brown, but we 
recognize the squirrel as squirrel. The identification of the thing that is 
being discussed (made possible by its nature, the substantial form grasped 
by the intellect as a universal concept) is necessary in order to even have 
the dispute about properties. Certain attributes or properties generate directly 
from the nature of the being and are, thus, essential. Other attributes are 
specific to individuals and are, thus, accidental. Even though it is 
genetically determined whether a particular squirrel will be black or grey, 
color is accidental to its being a squirrel. On the other hand, storing nuts is 
essential; it is their nature to do so. 
Within this understanding of our world, all physical beings have 
matter, that out of which the thing is, and form, that which makes the thing 
be what it is. According to Aristotle, nature is both matter and form, but it 
is more clearly form because it is form that is the principle that makes the 
thing a particular kind. Reflecting on what has been said of knowledge, it 
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can be seen that it is form that is the universal grasped by the intellect as 
the concept. 
In order to clarify the meaning of nature, it is necessary to distinguish 
the natural from the artificial. Philosophers are very interested in making 
distinctions because careful identification of similarities and differences 
allows for clarity of thought. Comparing the natural and the artificial, we 
see that events and things that occur entirely by nature are outside of human 
control; while, something totally artificial is designed and implemented by 
humans. It would also be composed of constructed materials, like plastic. 
There is, of course, a wide range between these extremes. The desk may be 
made in a factory with wood provided by nature. The oak tree grew with 
little or no human assistance while the design and construction of the desk 
was by human craft. Natural things have their principle of change within 
them. Artifacts have undergone change from outside of themselves. They 
have been acted upon. The wooden desk can deteriorate because it is made 
of oak. It does not fall apart as desk, but as wood. Desks do not have 
internal principles of change, wood does. But, the wood of the desk cannot 
maintain itself or grow because it is no longer living. It has lost its internal 
principle of growth. Its activity is now only decay. This deterioration can 
be delayed by the right environment but after a time the bonds that held 
molecules together as oak can no longer do so and cracking or splinters 
occur. The critical distinction is that nature generates change from within 
as when the sapling grows into a tree or the calf matures into a cow. 
Although the artist collaborates with nature, as when Michelangelo studied 
the marble before sculpting to ensure that it "contained" the statue of David, 
the artifact has principles of change imposed on it. We generally think of 
artifacts as being made by humans but the dam is an artifact of beavers and 
the nest of birds. Philosophers, however, reserve the term "artificial" for 
things made by humans. Thus, nature is intimately indwelling and not 
something added to or just associated with a thing. This includes the living 
and the nonliving, the organic and the inorganic. Nature is that which gives 
rise to existence, growth and development, and the characteristic activities 
and properties of the thing. It is also that which brings the thing to 
completion, decline and decay when it has reached the limit of size or 
existence. There are four critical notes included in this definition. (1) 
Nature is a principle of activity. (2) Nature is a principle of rest. (3) Nature 
is an internal principle. (4) Nature is not added on, it is what the thing is. 
Human Nature 
Recalling that nature is an internal principle of activity and rest, 
intimately inherent to the thing of which it is the principle, within a realist 
understanding, then, human nature is the stable form within each human. It 
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is grasped on a universal level by the intellect from experience of individual 
humans. Because of this ability to grasp form, human kind can be known 
and can provide principles that explain and at some point, prescribe human 
actions. While sharing this immaterial form in common with those like 
themselves, individuals are materially and quantitatively distinct in 
existence from others of the same kind. Within the world of nature, of 
which humans are only one kind, all physical beings have matter, that out 
of which the thing is, and form, that which makes the thing be what it is. 
An individual is stabilized, unified and specified by its natural form.1 4 So, 
within the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of nature, humans are an 
integral unity of matter and form. When unified, stabilized living materials 
are present and these are specified by human DNA, the living organism is 
a human being. 15 This internal principal of life remains as the new individual 
throughout infancy, adolescence, adulthood, and old age. This principle is 
no longer present when the individual has died and the physical materials 
of the individual begin to disintegrate as they lose their organization and 
stable structure. 
Human nature is also called the soul. The soul is the source of all 
human capacities or powers. In contemporary thought the soul is often 
associated with supernatural, spiritual powers, distinct from the body. 
However, within classical Greek philosophy soul meant principle of life. 
All living creatures have souls; plants, animals and humans. Each type of 
soul is a nature specific to the kind of individual and empowering the 
materials of the individual. Assisted by Thomas Aquinas and contemporary 
science, Wallace provides an updated account of Aristotle's teaching on the 
capacities of the soul using epistemic models. 16 A verbal account will need 
to be sufficient for our purposes . The reader is referred to Wallace for a 
more comprehensive treatment of the powers of the soul. 17 
Human nature is captured through fourteen identifiable powers in a 
dynamic interrelationship with each other and the environment. As 
composed of matter, that is elements and compounds, humans share with 
all things the (1) strong nuclear forces , the (2) weak radioactive forces, (3) 
gravity, and the (4) electromagnetic forces of chemical reactions. These are 
the four powers that the living share with the non-living, even with air, dirt 
and stones. Within health care these forces become especially important 
with events that challenge fluid and electrolyte balance. 
Humans share with plants and all living things the (5) capacities for 
environmental reactions of homeostatic control, (6) food and energy 
conversions of metabolism, (7) cell differentiation and growth of 
developmental powers, and (8) reproduction. The four powers of the 
inorganic, plus these four capacities characteristic of plants are the minimal 
requirements of life. Life threatening events move beyond biochemical 
stability and concerns of oxygen saturation and the ability to aerobically 
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process energy, to questions of supportive homeostasis and metabolism. 
Even though growth, development and reproductive capacities enter into 
most health care decisions, they are especially important issues in health 
education and preventive care. 
Beyond plants, animals have powers especially developed to (9) 
recei ve stimuli through the external senses and to (10) use motor powers to 
respond to their environments. Not all animals share the five outer senses 
that humans have but many do. Humans have sight, hearing, smell, taste, 
and touch. Additionally, animals have many different modes of mobility. A 
few are stationary, but mobility is characteristic of animals. Further, 
animals with nervous systems use (11) the inner senses of the brain to 
organize sensations into images that can be compared with past experiences 
or that allow an immediate awareness of safety or harm and can be stored 
in memory. The inner senses are coordination, memory, imagination u;)d 
an immediate estimative sense of safety or harm. This sensory knowledge 
allows the dog to recognize the person who has been kind, and the rat to 
solve the problem in the maze. It also results in an immediate withdrawal 
from danger. On the human level we have experienced this when realizing 
we have removed our hand from the hot stove. There is first the retreat to 
safety and then cognition or thinking about what we have done. Humans 
also share with the animals (12) behavioral responses of emotions and 
appetites. This is especially apparent when a cat uses motor powers to tum 
her back on dinner because she is not hungry for what has been served, or 
the two-year-old simply pouts and throws dinner on the floor. The 
expression of these reactions required all of the twelve powers 
characteristic of animals. 
Human responses on the level of human actions go beyond interaction 
with the physical environment. The (13) intellect has the capacity to 
abstract the universal concepts of things from perceptions. With these 
concepts it can make and evaluate judgments and reason to new 
knowledge. Concepts may originate from within the physical world or they 
may be totally immaterial, like logical concepts developed by the intellect 
to organize ideas about the world. Examples of logical concepts would be 
subject, predicate, genus, species. Physical concepts would include the 
roundness and color of the ball. Wallace's development of a typology of 
concepts also includes mathematical, metaphysical, metrical and theoretical 
concepts. A complete treatment of these is beyond the work of this 
article. IS The distinction between interacting with the world in a physical 
way rather than a conceptual way is important, however. Perhaps this will 
be clearer with the following example: the cat is afraid of the dog, while a 
human afraid of the dog can consider what it means to be afraid. In fact, 
the human can think about its consideration of fear and how this 
consideration of fear is possible. The human can contemplate life, 
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existence, self, thought, and even a supreme being. This capacity to reflect 
on immaterial thoughts is a sign ofthe spiritual nature of the human soul. It 
must be emphasized, though, that for Aristotle and Aquinas, the integrity of 
the individual is the intimate union of body and soul. Thus, this is not a 
dualist view of the body and soul, each separate, where the soul comes to 
dwell temporarily within the body. 
However, the immaterial capacity of contemplative thought is 
evidence that the human soul is not bound to matter in the same way as the 
animal soul. This immateriality is also why mathematical methods are not 
completely adequate in the study of humans and human interactions. This 
characteristic generates interesting questions, like, how can material 
biological existence provide for immaterial powers? Aristotle argued that 
the immateriality of human nature would require an immaterial origin, a 
divine source. Fortunately, the metaphysical questions do not have to be 
answered to appreciate that humans are distinct in their capacities of the 
intellect and the will. 
The final and also uniquely human capacity is (14) the will, the desire 
or appetite of the intellect. What an individual knows, if it is something 
that can be acquired, generates a desire for itself, and the will is our 
capacity to choose. This known to which we are referring may be as broad 
and lofty as truth itself, or as specific and physical as the pizza we want for 
dinner. Within this understanding, freedom of choice requires knowledge 
of the desired object and the outcomes of actions. An action selected based 
on emotion and appetite is voluntary, but not chosen. Additionally, in the 
face of strong emotion, known principles of action fade and become 
unusable to the individual because intense feelings cloud the intellect and 
what was previously known fades. Principles of action known since 
childhood can become just words without meaning. This distinction is used 
in the legal attribution of responsibility, for example, the distinction 
between manslaughter and first degree murder. It is critical within health 
care when a patient needs to choose between therapies, but is so afraid of 
the diagnosis that they are unable to understand what is being said. Their 
fears need to be dissipated and content spoken needs time to become 
understood. Another example is when a young lady is distraught because 
she is single and pregnant. If she acts impUlsively she may have an 
abortion then, when no longer pregnant, her emotions become calm and she 
is able to think more clearly. In a heartrending way she realizes that she has 
killed her child. The recrimination and quilt are part of what has come to be 
called Post-Abortion Syndrome. Aristotle would say in the Nicomachean 
EthicS l9, that this reaction itself shows that while the action was in some 
way voluntary, it was also non-voluntary. There was not full awareness of 
the situation either from ignorance or overwhelming emotions. There is 
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also a different moral accountability because she would not have performed 
the act if she had been able to understand what she was doing. 
Returning to the idea of the soul, or human nature, it may be helpful 
to think of a field of energy, an energizing force that is also stabilizing and 
specifying. This nature stabilizes the component parts of the individual and 
directs them to perform the functions characteristic of humans. 
Human Excellence (Health and Virtue) 
This review of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy has led to the 
identification of powers or capacities that result from the individual being 
of a particular kind. Homeostatic environmental interactions, food and 
energy conversions, and cell differentiation and growth are the abilities 
required to be a living being. For any particular species, health is more than 
being alive; it is the proper operation of all the organ systems an individual 
of that species requires for its life functions. More than this, health is the 
well-working of the organism as a whole. 
As with all animals, human health certainly requires a dynamic 
biochemistry that is growth-producing, and the well-working sensate, 
emotional , and motor capacities. One may speak of physical health as 
dependent on the care and development of the various organ systems. 
Mental health requires the proper working of the inner senses and 
behavioral response mechanisms. In addition to this, the excellence of 
functioning that is human health requires the well working of the intellect 
and will, i.e., concept formation, judgment, reasoning and the virtues. This 
understanding of health requires the development of habits that promote 
knowledge and proper action. The virtues of the intellect are science, art 
and good judgment (wisdom). Intellectual health requires education and 
training. Over and above this, social and spiritual health, involving the will, 
requires the development of good judgment and the moral virtues. Moral 
virtues include justice that moderates actions toward others, courage that 
tempers the more dramatic emotions like fear and rage, and moderation that 
curbs the appetites.20 
For Aristotle (and one can see applications today) happiness required 
wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation. Justice includes not only 
judicial and distributive issues but also good judgment in interpersonal 
affairs; the ability to see and do what needs to be done for another. Thls is 
finding the middle ground between excess and defect, between doing 
nothing and doing everything. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
characterizes virtuous behavior. First, he says, the individual "must know 
what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and he 
must choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring 
from a firm and unchangeable character."21 For the medical professional 
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these could be paraphrased that we must have the medical knowledge and 
skill (for the nurse or physical therapist it would be the knowledge 
appropriate to these professions), and choose to act for the benefit of the 
patient or family to move them toward the good end of health or a peaceful 
death, and we must act consistently for the benefit of the patient and/or their 
family. In doing this Aristotle says that one must also experience pleasure 
and pain "at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, 
for the right reason, and in the right manner."22 Knowledge and choice are 
thus insufficient; one must be emotionally disposed or aligned with the 
virtuous person in order to discern and act as a virtuous person. This is a 
professional who is identified as respected and valued in the community 
for their good judgment and emotional stability. This is a person to whom 
you can turn for advice when needed. 
Looking at the individual in the world from this focus on natures 
reveals humanity in such a way that one can see that each person reflects 
all of nature within themselves. In this way, the person is at home in the 
world. However, because of the immaterial capacities of intellect and will, 
he or she is capable of thinking beyond nature. Aristotle taught that the 
highest human activity, a state of absolute inner peace and happiness, was 
found in contemplation of the highest being, the unmoved mover, the 
uncaused cause.23 Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica would add 
the Ultimate Designer, the Absolute Truth and Goodness.24 It is the position 
of this paper that health care interventions are called to reflect the design 
and unity in human life. 
Human Nature and Ethical Practice 
The Aristotelian view of human nature can provide an explanation of 
humanity that is applicable in all practice disciplines. Human nature is the 
stability behind all of the apparent change within a person's life. To be 
human is to have this tight connection with the body and yet to live beyond 
the body within the world. When this Aristotelian understanding is 
complemented by the appropriate disciplinary theory it becomes specific 
to that practice discipline. 
The identification of human nature with the intellectual soul enables 
the professional to address the patient as uniquely human, but necessarily 
endowed with powers, shared with plants and animals, that must be 
maintained in order to preserve life. In fact, in the critical life and death 
moments these powers that maintain life have priority. Certainly, as 
human, the individual is capable of making informed choices and of setting 
health care goals. However, the essential unity of body and soul requires at 
least a minimal level of well-being of the nutritive and sensitive powers in 
order for the intellectual capacities to be available to the person. For 
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example, when the patient is comatose, nurses must attend to behavioral 
cues that reflect the functioning of the vegetative and sensitive capacities. 
The underfed and malnourished child and the victim of abuse are not able 
to sit in the classroom and read. Reading has little meaning when you hurt. 
Within this understanding of patients, maintaining life occurs on the 
level of biochemistry characteristic of the vegetative powers. Once the 
person is stabilized, concerns for the sensitive powers become more 
important, e.g., pain control and range of motion. With biological and 
behavioral stability the individual is free to learn. Activities that increase 
knowledge and choice promote the uniqueness of human life, but their 
promotion may be delayed in the acute care setting. Because all needs and 
behaviors are the products or effects of being human, human nature 
becomes the source of explanatory principles determining priorities in a 
practice setting. For example, while interventions that preserve life have 
the highest priority, interventions on the level of health education for health 
choice are the highest level of practice because these require the highest 
human capacities. 
The life-powers model of human nature indicates the importance and 
value of all levels of practice. Long term care of comatose patients appears 
to be sustaining the human at the nutritive level, however we are unaware of 
the activities of the soul in this state. Much has been written of profoundly 
comatose patients being affected by what they have heard. This is 
consistent with the immaterial nature of the human soul. Highly technical 
interventions are important for preserving life through the biochemical and 
mechanical bodily functions of the person. Without life all of the other 
capacities of the organic living person are not there. Behavioral and 
rehabilitative activities reintegrate the sensitive powers into the wholeness 
of the individual. Activities of health education in settings enhance the 
uniquely human powers. Knowledge gives the individual the freedom 
within which choice is a real possibility, nurturing authentic autonomy. 
This discussion has touched on ethical points that we can now 
summarize. 
(1) Human nature is the unifying, stabilizing principle that remains from 
the beginning of an individual, through youth, adulthood, aging and death. 
There can be no human search for truth nor desire for the goodness of life 
so characteristic of being human if one is not alive, so we are called to 
respect and preserve human life in all of its stages of development. 
(2) When an intrinsic internal principle of life is present, a human being is 
present.25 According to molecular embryology, this occurs at 52 hours after 
the sperm reaches the ovum, at the four cell stage. At this point it cannot be 
denied that the unborn is human, so either you must allow one stage of 
human life to be sacrificed for another or disallow embryonic stem cell 
research. 
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(3) Since all humans are related we share a common existence. Thus, one 
wonders if there ougqt to be research creating excessively expensive 
interventions so some wealthy humans can avoid the inconvenience of 
taking daily medications, while vast numbers of humans perish for lack of 
necessary food and water. This is a matter of distributive justice. 
(4) While maintaining physiological existence has the greatest urgency, 
health education for health promotion empowers patients and families to 
remain healthy preserving the unique capacities of human nature and are 
thus the highest health care functions. It would seem that health education 
for health promotion and illness prevention maximizes the use of health 
care dollars. 
(5) Patient and care-giver interventions that establish mutual goal setting 
are most effective as they mobilize intellect and will. This point is central 
to the work ofImogene King.26 
(6) Medical intervention is shared between physician and patient. Both are 
capable of knowledge and choice, but the physician's knowledge is more 
complete in depth and detail and the patient's ability to grasp content is 
limited by education and emotion. Additionally, the words commonly used 
within the medical community are unfamiliar to patients and families, being 
outside of their world of experience. Thus, the physician, while respecting 
the patient's capacity for knowledge and choice, needs to retain the role of 
wise counselor, trustworthy and trusted to act in the patient's best interest. 
(7) Autonomy and informed consent have their basis in human freedom. In 
order to be free to make a choice one needs to know principles involved in 
the situation, the circumstances, and what options are available. One needs 
emotional stability and the courage and determination (virtue) to follow the 
decision made. 
(9) The professional is also a human who has needs and abilities associated 
with being human that need to be respectedY 
(10) Thomas Aquinas' discussion of law uses the human capacity to know 
truth and the desire to choose the good as foundational for the first principle 
of human action, that is, to do good and avoid eviF8 Within medicine this 
would translate into the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. 
(11) The immateriality of the intellect evidenced by its immaterial capacity 
of conceptual thought opens the potential that the soul, the natural human 
form, continues after the death of the body. 
(12) Because humans have immaterial capacities health is more than bodily 
wholeness and excellence of function of the body. 
The reader may say, "I knew all of these. They are self-evident," or 
something similar. Philosophy usually does not intend to teach what is not 
known, but to make clearer what is the case and why it is the case. It seems 
apparent that to act with the richness of human existence is to be ethical. 
This synthesis of being and acting is seen in Robert Sokolowski's 
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description of medicine and the physician. He writes, "Because the art of 
medicine aims at something that is a good for the Ratient, the doctor, in the 
exercise of his art, seeks the medical good of the patient as his own 
good .... The nature of his art, with the perspectives it provides on the 
medical good, gives the physician this harmony, and it makes him, in the 
good exercise of his art, not only a good doctor but also essentially a good 
moral agent one who seeks the good of another formally as his own. The 
doctor's profession essentially makes him a good man, provided he is true 
to his art and foHows its insistence."29 
From the above list we note the four principles of ethics, 
nonmaleficience, beneficence, autonomy and justice can be seen to follow 
a realist understanding of human life. Pellegrino writes of autonomy, 
"Autonomy gets its status as a moral right of humans from the fact that 
human beings have the capacity to make rational judgments about their own 
lives, choices, and interests. Self-governance deserves respect because it is 
the way human beings actualize their powers of choice and choice is a 
distinctly human activity."30 Consistent with our treatment of the 
vegetative and sensitive capacities and the impact on health care, Pellegrino 
writes, " . . . the very fact of illness physiologically or psychologically 
compromises the actual expression of autonomy to some degree .... To 
restore autonomy, physicians must first attend to reversing these 
physiological and psychological impediments to the optimal exercise of 
autonomy." 3) 
With Pellegrino we look more closely at the medical encounter and 
find there are two activities of doctoring. The first involves technical 
medical content and the objective, empirical methods of science. The 
second aspect of doctoring is moral in nature. It is a decision and action 
that is good for this particular patient that is good for the individual both 
medically, and as a human being. He writes, "Medicine comes into 
existence qua medicine only when scientific knowledge is focused on a 
decision that is good for a particular patient." 32 These insights place human 
nature and human excellence as ethical action clearly in the center of the 
health care enterprise. Considering the immateriality of the human soul 
and its potential to survive the disintegration of the body, Pellegrino is right 
to be concerned with human destiny. Finally, we would do well to consider 
what he wrote about the internal morality of medicine concerning health 
and healing. He says, "Often, the meaning of the word health, namely 
'making whole again', cannot be achieved, but much can still be done to 
restore harmony or physiological and psychological function . To care, 
comfort, be present, help with coping, and to alleviate pain and 
suffering are healing acts as well as cure. In this sense, healing can occur 
when the patient is dying even when cure is impossible. Palliative care is a 
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healing act adjusted to the good possible even in the face of the realities of 
an incurable illness. Cure may be futile but care is never futile."33 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that a realist conception of knowledge and an 
Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective on human life can answer the challenge 
to provide from philosophical analysis a supporting structure for ethical 
practice within health care. We have considered the teachings of both 
Pellegrino and Wallace and shown how a medical ethics can emerge from 
a clear understanding of human nature as the shared form behind the 
medical act. From this ontological inquiry we have supported statements of 
ethical practice. It is surely the case that this work has not been exhaustive, 
but a movement toward a comprehensive philosophical ethics for health 
care grounded in the meaning of human life itself. Among the incomplete 
aspects opening the possibility of further research was the distinction 
between natural and artificial interventions and how this might impact 
decisions at the beginning and end of human life if one were to live in 
harmony with a sense of nature and human nature. We also left unexplored 
teleological aspects, seeking the good end of medicine and the meaning of 
the spiritual good as the transcendent end of human life. 
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